This is the rst systematic experimental study of the comparative performance of two incentive compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the Basic Quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard and the Paired-Di erence mechanism by Walker. Our experiments demonstrate that the performance of the Basic Quadratic mechanism under a high punishment parameter is far better than the same mechanism under a low punishment parameter, which, in turn, is better than the Paired-Di erence mechanism. We estimate three individual behavioral models: an exponentialized Relative-Payo -Sum model outperforms the Generalized Fictitious Play model. We also provide a su cient condition for convergence under the Basic Quadratic mechanism.
Introduction
How to design decentralized institutions to facilitate cooperation in an environment with public goods has been a challenging problem for economists for a long time. Natural processes, such as the voluntary contribution mechanisms, have been shown both theoretically and experimentally, to be unable to solve the \free-rider" problem (Ledyard 1995) . Therefore, since the 1970s, economists have been seeking decentralized mechanisms that are non-manipulable and achieve Pareto optimal allocation of resources with public goods.
By now it is well-known that it is impossible to design a mechanism for making collective allocation decisions, which is informationally decentralized, non-manipulable, and Pareto optimal (Green and La ont 1977 , Roberts 1979 and Walker 1980 . There are many mechanisms which preserve Pareto optimality at the cost of non-manipulability, some of which preserve \some degree" of non-manipulability. In particular, some mechanisms which have the property that Nash equilibria 1 are Pareto optimal have been discovered. These can be found in the work of Groves and Ledyard (1977) , Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) .
All these \next best" mechanisms have very similar static properties, which leads one to consider properties, other than optimality of Nash equilibria, in an e ort to distinguish among them. One important additional dimension of performance is the dynamics induced by these mechanisms in a laboratory. Any actual implementation is necessarily a dynamic process, starting somewhere o the equilibrium path. The fundamental question concerning implementation of a speci c mechanism is whether the dynamic processes will actually converge to one of the equilibria promised by theory. If the dynamic processes do not converge, then the nice properties in equilibrium cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is crucial to study the dynamic properties of a mechanism, and to extract the properties of static mechanisms that induce convergence. This motivates the research reported in this paper.
We select two Nash-e cient mechanisms to implement in a laboratory: the Basic Quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard (1977) and the Paired-Di erence mechanism by Walker (1981) . While the Basic Quadratic mechanism has been studied in laboratories, the PairedDi erence mechanism has not been systematically studied in laboratories. A comparison of these two families of mechanisms has not been performed either. This comparison allows us to abstract the properties that induce convergence when a mechanism is implemented among boundedly rational agents, i.e., to answer the question, what properties of a static mechanism can induce the subjects to learn to play an equilibrium strategy.
To study the dynamic learning processes induced by these mechanisms, we use two major families of learning models: an exponentialized Relative-Payo -Sum model and a Generalized Fictitious Play model. A static Equilibrium model is also analyzed as a benchmark.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical properties of the Basic Quadratic and Paired-Di erence mechanism. Section 3 goes over the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the group level results. Section 5 introduces the learning models and uses them to analyze the data. Section 6 discusses two additional aspects of the mechanisms that induce good dynamics and provides a su cient condition for convergence under the Basic Quadratic mechanism. Section 7 reviews previous implementation of these mechanisms and compares the ndings in this paper with those in Chen and Plott (1996) . Section 8 concludes the paper.
The Mechanisms { Static and Dynamic Properties
Two families of mechanisms are studied in the same environment: the Basic Quadratic mechanism (hereafter BQ) and the Paired-Di erence mechanism (hereafter PD). These two mechanisms have very similar static properties. Both are Nash-e cient and balanced with the same dimension of message space. The PD mechanism is also individually rational in equilibrium. These properties are introduced in turn.
The Basic Quadratic Mechanism -Static Properties
The Basic Quadratic mechanism is the rst mechanism in a general equilibrium model, in which through a government allocation-taxation scheme the behavioral equilibria (Nash) are Pareto optimal. And it balances the budget both on and o the equilibrium path.
The BQ mechanism speci es each individual's tax share by Therefore, an individual's tax share is composed of three parts: the per capita cost of production, X b=I, plus a positive multiple, =2, of the di erence between her own message and the mean of others' messages, ((I ?1)=I) (x i ? ?i ) 2 , and the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages, 2 ?i . While the rst two parts guarantee that Nash equilibria of the mechanism are Pareto optimal, the last part insures that budget is balanced both on and o the equilibrium path. Note that the free parameter, , determines the magnitude of punishment when an individual deviates from the mean of others' messages. Although it does not a ect any of the static theoretical properties of the mechanism, as we will see from the experimental evidence that varying can induce very di erent dynamics.
The BQ mechanism has two drawbacks: it does not satisfy the individual rationality constraint, i.e., an individual can be worse o as a result of participating in the process; in a general environment multiple equilibria can exist (Bergstrom, Simon and Titus 1983) . The way we deal with the rst problem is to give every subject an initial endowment. For the second problem, a quasilinear environment is used, in which there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium selection problem in a general environment is left for future research.
The Paired-Di erence Mechanism -Static Properties
The Paired-Di erence Mechanism implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, besides all the nice properties of the BQ mechanism, it is also individually rational in equilibrium, i.e., no individual will be worse o as a result of participating in the mechanism.
The PD mechanism speci es each individual's tax share by
where the level of individual i's tax, T PD i , depends upon her proposed addition, x i , the sum of proposed additions of other participants, S ?i , and the di erence between the amounts proposed by her two neighbors, d ?i . The amount, b=I + x i?1 ? x i+1 , is i's Lindahl price.
Therefore, an individual's tax share is composed of two parts: the per capita cost of production, X b=I, plus an amount determined by the messages of her two neighbors,
So far the two families of mechanisms have very similar static properties. The PD mechanism has one more advantage over the BQ mechanism in that it is individually rational in equilibrium. An interesting question is whether they will induce similar dynamic paths and properties.
Dynamic Properties of the Mechanisms
Following Hurwicz (1972) the Nash equilibrium of a game form can be viewed as a stationary point of some decentralized iterative adjustment process. In such a process, players may have incomplete information but continually revise their actions until a point is reached where unilateral deviation no longer pays. In most situations of economic interests when the provision of public goods is involved, individual agents do not know the characteristics of others. Therefore, we implement the mechanisms as nitely repeated games of incomplete information.
Presumably one could conduct a traditional equilibrium analysis of the repeated games by solving for the sequential equilibrium of each game and check whether players followed the sequential equilibrium. However, the informational and rationality requirements needed to reach such an equilibrium are extreme: not only the rationality of the players and the payo s are common knowledge, but also the beliefs they hold about each other's behavior need to be commonly known, which does not seem plausible in this experiment setting. Furthermore, in our experiment design, players only know their own payo s, so the sequential equilibrium analysis is not applicable.
When summarizing some of the lessons emerging from the large accumulation of experimental ndings on the behavior of the subjects in games, Smith (1990) suggests that (1) in a one-shot game, behavior is not well predicted by equilibrium; (2) in a repeated, complete information setting, players tend to \cooperate" and thus repeated game e ects emerge, though they are hard to predict; and (3) in a repeated setting with incomplete information, where players have knowledge of their own payo s only, the best predictors of long-run behavior are the equilibria of the one-shot game with complete information.
Since the environment in (3) is exactly the environment for this set of experiments, and is also the environment that most learning processes postulate, throughout the paper we adopt the working hypothesis prevalent in the learning literature that subjects focus on the stage-game strategies (see, e.g., Crawford 1995) . We explore the hypothesis that stage game equilibrium is reached via a process of gradual adjustment by boundedly rational players who encounter each other in a repeated setting. The key question then is whether a particular dynamic process will converge to an equilibrium. Typical examples are Cournot best response dynamics and ctitious play learning process. Precise de nitions of both dynamics are provided in Section 5 as special cases of the Generalized Fictitious Play model.
There have been two theoretical papers studying the dynamic properties of these Nash mechanisms. Muench and Walker (1983) studied the convergence condition of the BQ mechanism using Cournot best response dynamics in a parameterized quadratic quasilinear environment and found that the process converged when > I. In Section 6 a generalization of this result to a general quasilinear environment and a much wider class of learning dynamics will be provided. Kim (1986) proved that in certain quadratic non-quasilinear environments game forms which implement Lindahl allocations, including the PD mechanism, are unstable under any decentralized adjustment process. To our best knowledge there has been no published theoretical study of the dynamic stability properties of the PD mechanism in quasilinear environments.
Experimental Design
The experimental design re ects both technical and theoretical considerations. The economic environment and experimental procedures are discussed in the sections below.
The Economic Environment
We are interested in an environment where theoretically the voluntary contribution mechanism predicts zero provision, while the BQ mechanism and PD mechanism predict Pareto e cient provision of public good. A second consideration is the in uence of the punishment parameter in the BQ mechanism on the convergence of the dynamic processes.
The parameters chosen for the experiments involve ve individuals, I = 5. In all experiments a simple constant unit cost, b, is used to produce the public good, which is set to 100. Preferences are induced on units of the abstract public good by an individually speci ed value function, V i (X), which indicates the amount of money an individual will receive if the group choice of the public good is X and if the individual pays nothing for it. For simplicity and for comparison of our results with previous experiments, the valuation functions are set to be quadratic,
Therefore individual i's per period payo is i = V i (X) ? T m i , where m 2 fBQ; PDg.
Given the size of the economy, the punishment parameter, , de nes a family of BQ mechanisms. To study the e ects of the punishment parameter on the dynamics and learning processes of the BQ mechanism, we set = 1 and 100.
In implementing the PD mechanism, one problem is the selection of one possible mechanism from an entire family. Given an economy with I individuals, there are jIj!=(2I) di erent possible circles and hence jIj!=(2I) corresponding equilibria. Of all the 12 circles that correspond to di erent PD mechanisms in this environment, we let the computer randomly pick a circle, 1-2-4-3-5, to implement. (1) In a voluntary contribution mechanism, the theoretical equilibrium is zero contribution for all subjects, while the three incentive compatible mechanisms predict Pareto e cient level of public goods, X = 5, as shown in the last row. (2) fB i g i varies among subjects to induce diverse tastes for the public good. (3) Initial endowments, f i g i were set such that the equilibrium payo s of all subjects, e i , tabulated in the last three columns of Table 1 , are approximately the same in all three mechanisms. (4) the equilibrium contributions for BQ1 and BQ100 are all integers, and the PD equilibria mutiplied by ve are also integers. To avoid fractions, the subjects actually chose 5x, and all formula were adjusted accordingly. Therefore, in all three mechanisms, subjects could choose any integer from -20 to 30, which includes all the stage game equilibria.
Experimental Procedures
Seven independent computerized sessions for each mechanism were conducted in March, April and May 1996: four at Caltech, and three at the University of Amsterdam. All sessions were conducted in English by the rst author. Thus, the problems with the experimenter e ect and the language e ect (Roth et. al. 1991) are circumvented. Our subjects were students from the two universities. No subject was used in more than one session. This gives us a total of 105 subjects and 21 independent sessions. Each session consisted of 100 rounds with no practice round, which lasted between one and two hours, with the rst half an hour being used for instructions. Table 2 summarizes session numbers, dates and places experiments were conducted, and the conversion rates of these experiments. The conversion rates were set such that the expected average earning per hour was approximately the same as that of other experiments in each lab. The PD mechanism took longer than the BQ mechanisms, therefore the conversion rate was set lower.
Subjects who participated in an experimental session randomly drew an I.D. number. Then each of them was seated in front of the corresponding terminal, with a folder containing a set of instructions, payo chart(s) and record sheets. After the instructions were read aloud, subjects were required to nish the Review Questions, which were designed to test their understanding of the instructions 2 . Afterwards, the experimenter checked answers individually and answered questions. After this, subjects signed the Financial Agreement 3 . Then the experimenter read the computer instruction.
The mechanisms were implemented as nitely repeated games of incomplete information. At round t, a subject submitted her proposed addition, x i (t). After everyone submitted their proposals, the following information appeared on i's screen: Some subjects did use the History page. Since most subjects had the above information recorded, they did not use the History page that often.
The process was repeated for 100 rounds, which was announced at the beginning of the instructions. At the end of a session, the subjects recorded their total earnings (in ctitious currency) for all rounds and converted them to dollar (or guilder) payments. The conversion rate was announced in the instructions and was written on the board for their attention.
To summarize the information conditions, apart from the above information on their screen, each subject knew her own valuation function, the BQ cost function, or the PD cost function. They knew that other subjects in the same group might have di erent valuation functions, but everyone faced the same cost function. They did not know the distribution of preferences.
Group Level Results
The instructions and the complete data are available from the authors upon request. Results on the aggregate performance of the mechanisms are summarized in Result 1 to Result 4. Two questions are of overriding importance. The rst is related to the actual performance of the BQ and PD mechanism in general. The second is related to the underlying principles of individual behavior. We address the rst question in this section. A more detailed examination of individual behavioral models is reserved for the next section.
Group e ciency, mean and standard deviation of public good level, the average absolute deviation from the optimal level of public good, and the number of violations of the individual rationality constraint for each session are tabulated in Table 3 . Table 3 about here.] most subjects also recorded S ?i (t) and d ?i (t) on the margin, which we subsequently added to the record sheets with a mark of optional], in all the formal sessions. We found that all subjects recorded x i (t) and i (t), about 80% also recorded S ?i (t) and d ?i (t).
Group e ciency is calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of the actual earnings of all subjects in a session and the Pareto optimal earning of the group. As a benchmark case, if no public good is produced, the system e ciency is E 0 = Total initial endowment in private good P.O. value of the group = 525 1035 = 50:73%
Result 1 : The ranking of group e ciency is highly signi cant: BQ100 > BQ1 > PD. SUPPORT. The third column in Table 3 lists the sessional group e ciency under the three mechanisms. Permutation tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan 1988, pp.95-100.) show that BQ100 > BQ1 at a signi cance level of 0.23% (one-tailed), BQ100 > PD at a signi cance level of 0.03% (one-tailed), BQ1 > PD at a signi cance level of 0.20% (one-tailed). 2
Result 1 shows that BQ100 generates the highest group e ciency, followed by BQ1, and then PD mechanism.
As can be seen from the fourth column of Table 3 , and con rmed by permutation tests, the average levels of public good provision are not signi cantly di erent across mechanisms, since the mean averages out the over-and under-provision of public good across di erent rounds. However, the standard deviations from the average public good levels are signicantly di erent.
Result 2 : The ranking of the standard deviation from the average level of public good is highly signi cant: BQ100 < BQ1 < PD.
SUPPORT. The fth column of Table 3 shows the standard deviation of the average level of public good. Permutation tests show that BQ100 < BQ1 at a signi cance level of 0.17% (one-tailed), BQ100 < PD at a signi cance level of 0.03% (one-tailed), BQ1 < PD at a signi cance level of 0.12% (one-tailed). 2
Result 2 shows that BQ100 induces the least amount of dispersion in the level of public good provided from period to period. It is followed by BQ1, and then by PD.
To assess how successful each mechanism is in providing close to Pareto optimal level of public good, we de ne a measure D = 100 X t=1 jX(t) ? 5j=100; as the average absolute deviation of the total level of public good each round from the Pareto optimal level of 5.
Result 3 : The ranking of average absolute deviation from the Pareto optimal level of public good is highly signi cant: BQ100 < BQ1 < PD.
SUPPORT. The sixth column of Table 3 shows the average absolute deviation from the Pareto optimal level of public good. Permutation tests show that BQ100 < BQ1 at a signi cance level of 2.10% (one-tailed), BQ100 < PD at a signi cance level of 0.03% (onetailed), BQ1 < PD at a signi cance level of 0.26% (one-tailed). 2
Result 3 states that BQ100 produces the closest to Pareto e cient level of public good, followed by BQ1, followed by PD.
One advantage of the PD mechanism over the BQ mechanism is that it is individually rational in equilibrium. However, if the equilibrium is not reached, the individual rationality constraint can be violated.
Result 4 The ranking of the number of violations of the individual rationality constraints is highly signi cant: PD > BQ1 and PD > BQ100.
SUPPORT. The last column of Table 3 shows the total number of violations of IR constraints in each session. Permutation tests show that PD > BQ1 at a signi cance level of 0.12% (one-tailed), PD > BQ100 at a signi cance level of 0.03% (one-tailed); BQ1 > BQ100 at a signi cant level of 19.30% (one-tailed), which is not signi cant at the usual 5% level. 2
Result 4 is striking in that there are signi cantly more violations of the IR constraint in the PD sessions than in the BQ sessions, even though theoretically the PD mechanism is supposed to be individually rational in equilibrium. This result demonstrates the importance of the dynamic properties of the mechanisms which had been largely ignored in the literature.
The aggregate results indicate that the performance of BQ100 is far better than BQ1, and both are better than PD. Since the three mechanisms have very similar static properties, it is clear that individual behavior is important in understanding the dynamics that lead to the above results. In the next section, we evaluate several learning models in an attempt to understand individual behavior.
5 Learning \Learning" can be viewed as any systematic change of behavior due to experience accumulation. A learning model, following the probabilistic approach of Bush and Mosteller (1955) , is a mathematical system which predicts the probabilities of available choices or feasible actions at the next occurrence. There are many learning models attempting to capture the principles of human learning behavior (Tang 1995) . Since it might be misleading to claim which model is the \true" description, we evaluate two major classes of models to see which one tracks the data better under di erent mechanisms.
To evaluate the accordance between model predictions and the experimental data, one can measure the deviation of the model predictions from the actual choices by the quadratic deviation measure (QDM), which is a proper scoring rule 5 . We also evaluated all models by two other scoring rules, the absolute deviation measure (ADM) 6 and the proportion of inaccuracy (POI) scores 7 . All qualitative results hold under all three scoring rules, although only the QDM scores are reported here. Other scores are available from the authors.
Recall that subjects can choose any integer, 5x i 2 f?20; ; 30g, namely, each has 51 stage-game strategies under each mechanism. We reduce the 51 strategies to eleven choice intervals, by dividing a choice number by 5 and rounding it up to the nearest integer in order to have mutiple observations for each strategy interval (see, e.g., Roth and Erev 1995) . Note that under this treatment, all equilibria in each mechanism are still treated equally, even if they are not integers, since choices in the neighborhood of radius 0.5 of an integer are also given credit.
Let j = 1; ; 11 correspond to the strategies of choosing the number f?4; ?3; ; 5; 6g:
Letc i (t) = (c i1 (t); c i2 (t); ; c i11 (t)) denote the indicator vector of subject i's contribution at round t, 5 A scoring rule is \proper" if it does not give the forecaster any incentive to \ignore the veri cation system", or even worse, to \play the system". See Yates (1990) for a recent survey and Selten (1995) for the axiomatization of the quadratic scoring rule. 6 The absolute deviation measure is calculated as ADM = P 5 i=1 P 100 t=1 P 11 j=1 jc ij (t) ? p ij (t)j=5. 7 The proportion of inaccuracy score \returns the value of 0 if the subject made the most likely choice under the model, the value of 1 if the subject choose a strategy that di ers from the most likely prediction, and 1 -1/(the number of equally likely predictions) if the model predicts that few strategies are equally likely and the subject choose one of them. (Thus the POI score judges all the models on the basis of their deterministic' predictions, which should facilitate comparison of the deterministic models and the stochastic models.)", Erev and Roth 1996, pp.25. c ij (t) = 8 < : 1; if alternative j is chosen in round t, 0; otherwise. Letp i (t) = (p i1 (t); p i2 (t); ; p i11 (t)) denote the predicted choice probability vector for subject i at round t. Then the quadratic deviation for subject i at round t is
It follows that the average quadratic deviation for an entire session is
And the overall average quadratic deviation measure for each mechanism is the average QDM scores over all seven sessions. Apparently, the smaller the QDM score a model produces, the better its prediction is.
Three di erent classes of models are evaluated on this data set: a static benchmark, an exponentialized Relative-Payo -Sum (RPS) model, and a class of population learning models, called a Generalized Fictitious Play model. The reason we focus on the last two categories of learning models is two-fold: the RPS-type models emerge as the top performers among the 18 di erent models evaluated in Tang (1995) ; however, the ctitious play model, which revived a lot of theoretical attention lately, is too in uential to be ignored. In the subsequent parts, we present the most important parts of the learning models we have tested and discuss the implication of the results.
Static Benchmark -the Equilibrium Model
The Equilibrium Model uses stage game equilibrium as the prediction, p ij (t) = 8 < : 1; if alternative j is a stage game equilibrium strategy for i, 0; otherwise.
Note that while the QDM score of any learning model is an indicator of how well the learning model performs, only the QDM score of the equilibrium model is an indicator of how well a mechanism performs. One important measure of the performance of a mechanism is whether it induces convergence to its stage game equilibrium. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the numerical results from evaluating all three learning models, where the \best" or minimum QDM scores are tabulated for each model. Table 4 presents the initial values, the estimated parameter values and the average QDM scores over all seven sessions for PD, BQ1 and BQ100 respectively. Table 5 gives the QDM scores of each individual session, using the same estimated parameter values as those listed in Table 4 . Recall that a QDM score is the sum of 100 rounds of quadratic deviations between model predictions and actual choices. Therefore, the smallest possible score is 0 if a model gives completely correct predictions, and the largest possible score is 200 if every prediction is wrong.
One striking result is that the static Equilibrium model produces extraordinarily small QDM scores under BQ100, but very large QDM scores under the other two mechanisms.
Result 5 : Individual players under BQ100 followed their stage game equilibria at an extraordinarily high frequency, much higher than under either BQ1 or PD. Individual players under BQ1 followed their stage game equilibria at a higher frequency than under PD.
SUPPORT. The \Equilibrium Model" segment from Table ? ? shows the sessional average QDM scores for PD, BQ1 and BQ100 are 183.09, 169.71, 13.03 respectively. On the sessional level, the \Equilibrium Model" segment from Table 5 shows that QDM(BQ100) < QDM(BQ1), or QDM(BQ100) < QDM(PD) is so obvious that any statistical test is superuous. Permutation test shows that QDM(BQ1) < QDM(PD) at a weak signi cant level of 8.4% (one-sided). 2
As an extension of the above result, we would like to see whether a mechanism induced convergence to its stage game equilibrium. Theoretically, convergence implies that no deviation will ever be observed once the system equilibrates. In an experimental setting with long iterations, even after the system equilibrates, subjects sometimes experiment by occasional deviation. Therefore, it is necessary to have some behavioral de nition of convergence: a system converges to an equilibrium at round t, if x i (s) = x e i , 8i and 8s t, except for a maximum of n rounds of deviation for s > t, where n is small. For our experiments of 100 rounds, we let n 5, i.e., there could be a total of up to 5 rounds of experimentation or mistakes after the system converged. Admittedly, the requirement of n 5 is to some extent arbitrary. However, it is necessary to have some criterion in order to distinguish between sessions that converged and those that did not converge, and to have a measure of the speed of convergence.
Result 6 : Every session of BQ100 converged to its stage game equilibrium, most of which converged fairly quickly. BQ1 and PD never converged to their stage game equilibrium.
SUPPORT. The seven sessions of BQ100 (Session No. 15 to 21) converged to its stage game equilibrium on the following round: 22, 9, 76, 44, 9, 44, 60 . In all seven sessions, every deviation after convergence was made by a single subject while all other subjects still chose their stage game equilibrium strategy. The other two mechanisms never converged to their stage game equilibria. Moreover, stage game equilibrium under BQ1 and PD was not even reached by all subjects simultaneously at any round in any session. 2
Results 5 and 6 provide further evidence in ranking the performance of the mechanisms. Although the equilibrium model is not really a dynamic learning model, it provides a baseline for the comparison of genuinely dynamic learning models. In the next section we will present results that rank the performance of two dynamic learning models.
Dynamic Learning Models
This section contains analysis of the exponentialized Relative-Payo -Sum (RPS) model and the Generalized Fictitious Play model.
The basic idea of the RPS type of model is that an individual is more likely to choose a strategy which has yielded relatively higher payo s to her in the past. Therefore, it is also called a reinforcement learning model or stimulus response model (Fudenberg and Levine 1996) . Learning models in this spirit have a long history in biology and psychology, but their systematic application in experimental economics seems to start from Roth and Erev (1995) , where several variants of the basic linear form were used to construct computer simulations at the group or population level to track the ultimatum bargaining, best-shot and market game experimental data from a comparative study in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo. They did not generalize their simulations to nonlinear functional forms.
Since each of our experimental session consists of 100 rounds, which is long enough for performing more detailed analysis than the possibility available to Roth and Erev (1995) , we can compare the performance of various learning models in tracking the data down to the individual level.
We use a nonlinear variant of the basic RPS model called Exponentialized-RPS model.
De ne M ij (t) as the discounted payo sum of individual i to choose strategy j, M ij (t) = qM ij (t ? 1) + c ij (t) ik (t); where q 2 0; 1] is the time/memory discount factor. Then the predicted probability for subject i at round t+1 is p ij (t + 1) = e M ij (t) P 11 k=1 e M ik (t) ; 8i; j; where 0 helps to scale up (when > 1) or scale down (when < 1) the relative weights of the discounted payo sums. When = 0, the model degenerates into a random choice model.
This model is also called the Quantal Response Learning Model (Mookherjee and Sopher 1996) , which is a dynamic learning version of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1994) . This approach originated in the multinomial logit framework used in the econometric models of discrete choice (see, e.g., McFadden 1984) .
One advantage of the exponentialized-RPS model is that negative payo s can be treated the same as positive payo s, since the exponential function gives a positive number whether the discounted payo sum is positive or negative.
The initial value we used for the exponentialized-RPS model is M ij (0) = 200; for all i; j;
since the rst-round payo s for most of our subjects were around 200. We have also tried various other initial values, ranging from 10 to 500, which produced little di erence. It seems that due to the long sequence of play, as long as the initial values are not set too large or too small, the performance of the model is hardly a ected 8 . Furthermore, these initial values result in probability predictions around the centroid, (1=11; ; 1=11), a somewhat \natural" starting point for the rst round when no history information is available. For this model we have searched the discount factor q 2 0; 1] at a grid size of 0.05, and the parameter at a grid size of 0.001 until the minimum QDM scores are obtained.
Compared with the exponentialized-RPS model, where an individual subject bases her decision on her own past payo information only, population learning models allow an individual to base her decision on some summary statistics of the population as well. We use a Generalized Fictitious Play model (Cheung and Friedman 1995) to analyze the data.
It is straightforward to calculate the best response for both mechanisms. For the BQ mechanism, a player's best response to some predicted population characteristics is Since BQ100 induces fast and stable convergence to its stage game equilibria, all learning models perform very well under this mechanism. It is the relatively volatile dynamic paths of BQ1 and PD that provide a sharp separation of the performance of the exponentialized-RPS model and the Generalized Fictitious Play model. Tables 4 and 5 show that the Generalized Fictitious Play model produces much larger (almost double) QDM scores than the exponentialized-RPS model, not only at overall averages but also at independent sessional averages. The di erence is so obvious that statistical tests are super uous. Either permutation test or Wilcoxon test can give a clear-cut statistic separation at 1% signi cance level (one-tailed). 2
One might argue that these two types of learning models are not entirely comparable, since the generalized ctitious play model is a deterministic model which makes extreme predictions of 0 or 1, while the exponentialized-RPS model makes stochastic predictions. To correct for this bias, we also evaluated both learning models under the absolute deviation measure and proportion of inaccuracy scores. All the results still hold under these two scoring rules.
Incentives to Learn, Deviation Sensitivity and Stability
Since implementation of a static mechanism usually starts somewhere o the equilibrium path, disequilibrium aspects of a mechanism are especially important in inducing convergence to the equilibrium. We de ne deviation cost, DC " , as a subject's net utility loss when she deviates " from the equilibrium strategy, i.e., DC " = (x e ) ? (x e + "); where x e is the equilibrium strategy of a player. Subscripts are suppressed for simplicity. It is straightforward to calculate the deviation costs for the two mechanisms: DC " (BQ) = V (S + x e ) ? T BQ (x e j ;
2 )] ? V (S + x e + ") ? T BQ (x e + "j ; This measure, DC " , captures the incentive a mechanism gives a subject to learn to play equilibrium strategies. When a subject is away from the equilibrium, the higher the punishment is, the higher an incentive she has to learn to play an equilibrium strategy. This incentive is captured by the possible increase in utility (or monetary payo s). Since DC " (BQ100) >> DC " (BQ1) > DC " (PD); the punishment for deviation from equilibrium strategies is much higher in BQ100 than in either BQ1 or PD. This partly explains why convergence was so fast in BQ100, and why the frequencies that the subjects play their stage game equilibrium strategies follow the same ordering. When a mechanism is implemented and a player is not playing her equilibrium strategy, she should \know" that she is not doing her best. Under BQ100 it can really result in big losses if one is not doing one's best, but not so much under BQ1 or PD.
A practical measure of system stability in actual implementation is how sensitive the system is to deviation. When a system reaches equilibrium, if one person deviates from equilibrium, what are the e ects on the rest of the subjects? Does the noise get diminished or ampli ed? For simplicity, the following analysis assumes best response dynamics. One could easily carry out the same analysis with other models, e.g., generalized ctitious play.
Suppose player j deviates " from her equilibrium message at time t, x j (t) = x e j + ", then for everyone else at time t + 1, the summary statistics is changed to S ?i (t + 1) = S ?i (t) + "; 8i 6 = j; With the parameters of our experiments, this is satis ed for both = 1 and 100. Therefore, any noise in the system due to deviation or mistake of some player gets diminished under the BQ mechanism. Furthermore, notice that @DS BQ @I < 0; i.e., the noise gets diminished more, the larger the population is. This is because with the BQ mechanism, players react to the mean of everyone else's message. In a large population, noise created by deviation gets averaged out. This is not true with the PD mechanism. Under the PD mechanism,
x i (t + 1) = So noise in the system from someone's deviation or mistake does not get diminished except possibly for i = j ? 1, rather, it either remains the same (i 6 = j ? 1; j + 1) or gets ampli ed (i = j + 1), which can cause the system to unravel.
For a full stability analysis of the two families of mechanisms in a general quasilinear environment, a su cient condition for convergence under a wide class of learning dynamics is provided below for the BQ mechanism, while an observation is made for the PD mechanism.
For a general quasilinear utility function, V i = u i (X)+ i , where u i ( ) is C 2 and concave, the payo to individual i is m i = u i (X) + i ? T m i , where m 2 fBQ; PDg. From Milgrom and Roberts (1990) we know that supermodular games 9 converge to its unique Nash equilibrium under a wide class of interesting learning dynamics, including Bayesian learning 10 , ctitious play, adaptive learning, Cournot best response, and many others. Therefore, supermodularity is a very robust stability criterion for public goods mechanisms. 9 A supermodular game is such that, for each player i, her strategy space is a subset of a nite Euclidean space, i has increasing di erences in (x i ; x ?i ), and i is supermodular in x i .
10 By Bayesian learning, we mean that each player has a prior belief about her opponents' types or possible payo functions, which is updated according to Bayes' rule after each round of repeated play. In each period players play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for their current probability beliefs about their opponents' types. See, e.g., Fudenburg and Levine 1996. then i has increasing di erences, or strategic complementarity between players' strategies. Note that the strategy space is one dimensional, so i is automatically supermodular in x i . These two conditions, together with bounded strategy space in R 1 , give us a supermodular game.
Proposition 1 generalizes Muench and Walker's (1983) convergence result to a wider class of learning dynamics over a more general set of preferences. It also explains why BQ100, which is a supermodular game, converges so fast and remains stable under all learning models evaluated. On the other hand, BQ1 is not a supermodular game.
For the PD mechanism, we have Therefore, with general convex preferences the PD mechanism is not a supermodular game. The above analysis suggests that the success of a mechanism depends not only on its properties in equilibrium, but also on its disequilibrium properties. The comparative performance of the BQ mechanism and the PD mechanism, as well as their disequilibrium properties, provides some lessons for mechanism design. Two aspects are identi ed, the incentives to learn, and deviation sensitivity. The deviation cost, DC " , imposes incentives for subjects to learn to play their equilibrium strategies by punishing deviations. With proper incentives, such as that of BQ100, a mechanism can successfully induce a subject to play equilibrium strategies. The deviation sensitivity coe cient a ects whether noise in a system gets diminished or ampli ed. A mechanism that uses population characteristics, such as the mean of others' messages, can be designed in such a way that the noise gets diminished in the system. On the other hand, a mechanism that uses individual players' characteristics, such as the di erence of one's two neighbors' messages, tends to get unstable because idiosyncrasies or mistakes of a single player can cause the entire system to unravel. A supermodular mechanism has a robust stability property since a wide class of learning dynamics converge to its Nash equilibrium.
Comparison with Previous Work
There has been little experimental work on the PD mechanism. Robin Hanson ran a pilot experiment testing the PD mechanism with the Smith process, and found nonconvergence. Results of his pilot experiments have not been published or summarized in a working paper. This paper reports the rst systematic experimental study of the PD mechanism.
There have been three groups of experiments with mechanisms motivated by the BQ mechanism.
First, Smith (1979) conducted two sets of experiments, using a simpli ed version of the BQ mechanism, which only balanced the budget in equilibrium. The process used was the Smith process, where all the subjects need to repeat the same choice three times in a row to nalize the production of public goods, and they were only paid when agreements were reached.
Secondly, Harstad and Marresse (hereafter shortened as HM) (1982) had run experiments using the complete version of the BQ mechanism. The Seriatim process used in HM also requires unanimity of the subjects to produce the public good, but it di ers from the Smith process in that subjects only need to repeat their messages once for an iteration to end.
Neither Smith nor HM studied the e ects of the punishment parameter, , on the performance of the mechanism. More recently, Chen and Plott (hereafter shortened as CP) (1996) did the rst set of experiments to assess the performance of the BQ mechanisms under di erent punishment parameters, = 1 and 100. The Periodic process used by CP implemented the public goods game as a nitely repeated game, where subjects proposed a contribution each period and were paid for each decision they made. Unanimity was not required to produce the public good.
Our experimental design for the BQ mechanism resembles the CP experiments in that we also consider two treatments, = 1 and = 100, but di ers signi cantly in the experimental procedures, which lead to much sharper statistical comparisons of di erent treatments. The individual behavioral models analyzed in this paper are much richer than those in CP. Our theoretical result on the su cient conditions for convergence of the BQ mechanism is new. These di erence will be explained in detail below.
The CP experiments consist of four sequential sessions: two sessions with the order of = 1 proceeding = 100, and the other two with the reversed order. Since the two treatments are not independent, it is almost impossible to disentangle the learning e ects from the incentive e ects provided by the mechanism. In contrast, we have run seven independent sessions for each treatment, which allows us to perform analysis that requires statistical independence. Note that one session is only one independent observation due to the intrinsic strategic interaction among subjects within each session. To compare the dynamic paths induced by the mechanisms, we used much longer iterations, 100 rounds per session with no practice rounds, while the CP experiments have only 25 rounds per mechanism with 5 practice rounds before each trial. Practice rounds, as well as the sequential treatments which mixed up di erent mechanisms, interfere with the experimenters' control for learning e ects, while 25 rounds is too short to study the learning dynamics.
On the aggregate level, due to the lack of independent treatments, CP compared the e ciency and public goods levels of BQ1 and BQ100 by comparing the average. No statistical results were presented. Compared with all previous experiments on the BQ mechanisms, this is the rst time some clear and highly signi cant statistical results are presented.
On the individual behavioral level, CP examined the Cournot and Fictitious Play learning models, both of which are special cases of our Generalized Fictitious Play model. Our estimation of the Generalized Fictitious Play model suggests that the best discount factor lies generally in between 0.5 and 0.9, which yields neither the Cournot nor the Fictitious Play model. Apart from that, we also present some highly signi cant statistical results about the comparative performance of the exponentialized-RPS model, the Generalized Fictious Play model and the static Equilibrium model. Our new results show that the exponential-RPS model ts the BQ1 and PD data much better than the Generalized Fictitious Play model, and that individual players under BQ100 followed their stage game equilibria at a much higher frequency than under either BQ1 or PD.
On the theoretical level, CP did not provide a convincing dynamic theory to explain why BQ100 performed so much better than BQ1, therefore did not answer the question about the range of that ensures stability of the mechanism. Proposition ?? in this paper provides a su cient condition for the convergence of the BQ mechanism in a class of general quasilinear environments, thus giving the precise range of that induces stability under a wide class of learning dynamics. This result also generalizes theoretical work on the dynamic stability of the BQ mechanism by Muench and Walker (1983) .
Therefore, from the perspectives of the experimental design, aggregate and individual level analysis and results, and theoretical ndings, this study is a major substantive advance over CP and other previous experimental and theoretical studies of the BQ mechanism.
Concluding Remarks
The free-rider problem has been the corner stone of the problem of public goods provision. Many mechanisms promise a solution. Two of the most famous ones are the Basic Quadratic mechanism and the Paired-Di erence mechanism. Both have very similar static properties: Nash-e cient and balanced with the same dimension of message space. The PD mechanism also satis es the individual rationality constraint. However, our experiments show that they induce very di erent dynamics. Despite all the perfect static theoretical properties of the PD mechanism, the empirical evidence from our experiments indicates that in a simple quasilinear environment the BQ mechanism with a properly chosen punishment parameter has much better dynamic properties.
Comparing the performance of the BQ mechanism under a high punishment parameter ( = 100), a low parameter ( = 1), and the PD mechanism, we conclude that the performance of BQ100 is far better than BQ1, which, in turn, is better than PD, in terms of system e ciency, close to Pareto optimal level of public goods provision, less violation of the individual rationality constraint, and convergence to stage game equilibrium. All rankings are statistically highly signi cant.
These results suggest that when we design a mechanism, standard considerations, such as incentive compatibility, individual rationality and balanced budget, are not enough to guarantee that these desirable properties can actually be obtained in a dynamic process with real human subjects. Other disequilibrium aspects, such as deviation costs which impose incentives for subjects to learn to play their equilibrium strategies, and deviation sensitivity which can either amplify or diminish noise in a system, are also important to induce good dynamics and stability of a mechanism. We present a su cient condition for the BQ mechanism to converge under a wide class of learning dynamics, which provides a rigorous theoretical explanation for the good dynamic properties of BQ100.
Individual learning rules are important for us to understand the dynamic properties of incentive compatible mechanisms. In an attempt to understand the principles of individual learning behavior, we estimate three individual behavioral models. The exponentialized relative-payo -sum (RPS) model outperforms the population model of Generalized Fictitious Play on this data set.
To abstract aspects of mechanisms that induce boundedly rational individuals to play equilibrium strategies is an important but di cult task, which requires experimental studies of many mechanisms. This study begins to give us some intuition from comparing two interesting mechanisms. Further experimental study of other mechanisms are needed to con rm the intuition obtained from this study.
Appendix A. Experiment Instructions
The instructions for Mechanism A corresponds to BQ1. BQ100 is essentially the same as BQ1, with an adjusted formula, so it is not shown here. Mechanism W corresponds to the Paired-Di erence mechanism. Only the parts of instruction for Mechanism W which are di erent from those of Mechanism A are included. Both instructions are for subject #1 at Caltech. Instructions for the Amsterdam experiments are the same except for the names of currencies, as explained in the paper. All other instructions are available from the authors upon request.
Experiment Instructions { Mechanism A ID = 1 Introduction
You are about to participate in a decision process in which one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen. This is part of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
Your nal payo will be determined by a project level which will be chosen by the group, and by your individual expenditure on the project. The decision process will proceed as a series of rounds during each of which a project level will be determined and nanced. The \level" can be negative, zero or positive \units", the exact level of which must be determined.
In your folder, you will nd a chart which describes the payo s to you of various decisions, called the Payo Chart, and a \Record Sheet", where you will record your decision and payo each round. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
The Situation
The payo each period, which is yours to keep, is the di erence between the value to you of the project level which is chosen, and your individual expenditure on the project. All values are stated in francs and can be converted into cash at a rate of francs per dollar at the end of the experiment. Note that in some cases your values can be negative. It is also possible that your expenditures can be negative (that is, rather than paying for the project you are paid.). These will be explained in turn.
Project level determination (Y) Each round each individual will choose a proposed addition (x) to the status quo of zero project level. This proposed addition can be any integer amount ranging from -20 to 30 . These amounts will be added together to get the total of proposed additions (Y). This total is the project level that will be chosen. For example, if x 1 = 1; x 2 = 2; x 3 = 3; x 4 = 4; x 5 = 5, then the project level is Y = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 = 15.
Each unit of the project costs 100 francs. Hence, total cost for a project is 100 times the project size. In our example, it would be 1,500 francs. , so a Payo Chart that summarizes all of the relevant information will be used instead.
Payo Chart The payo chart summarizes both the value of the level of the project chosen and the level of individual expenditures that you will incur depending upon the choices of additions that you and other participants make. The horizontal axis is the sum of others' proposed additions, S. The vertical axis is your payo when the variability of others is V = 0. Each curve represents your payo from a particular choice of proposed addition, x. The small box on the right hand side of the chart gives the color of the curve for the eleven di erent proposed additions charted. Since the chart would be di cult to read if all possible proposed additions were plotted, only eleven di erent ones equal distant from each other are given. The curves for proposed additions which are not given, lie between the given curves. For example, the curve for a proposed addition of x = 11 would be between those of x = 10 and x = 15 and slightly closer to the x = 10 curve than the x = 15 curve. For example, in the Payo Chart on the screen, if you choose x = ?10, which is represented by the yellow curve on the Chart as indicated in the small box, and the sum of others' proposed addition is S = 35, then your value on the vertical axis for this period is 100. Another example, if you choose x = ?5, which is represented by the dark green curve on the Chart, and the sum of others' proposed addition is S = 10, then your value on the vertical axis for this period is 200.
Notice the values on the vertical axis of your payo chart are your payo s when the variability of others is V = 0. Your actual payo is the value on the vertical axis plus 0:02V .
Di erent participants might have di erent Payo Chart.
Procedure for Each Round At the beginning of each round, you will enter a proposal on the terminal. The central computer will then calculate the sum of others' proposals, the variability of others' proposals and your net payo , and send this information back to you. At the end of each round, you should record your proposed addition, x, in the rst column, and your payo , P, in the second column of your Record Sheet. You can also record the sum of others' proposals, S, in the third column of your Record Sheet, but this is optional.
It is crucial that you check your Payo Chart before and after each decision. From the Chart you can see your choice determine which curve you use, and others' choices determine the level of S and the amount of shift (due to V ) in your payo s.
There will be 100 rounds using this mechanism. There will be no practice rounds. From the rst round, you will be paid for each decision you make. 
Financial Agreement
Should my earnings from the experiment be negative, I agree to work in the EEPS Laboratory at a rate of seven dollars per hour until the loss is repaid. Name Signature Date
Computer Instructions At the beginning of each round, you are free to enter any proposed integer addition, x, between -20 and 30 , and then press the S key to prepare to submit it. If you would like to change your selection, use the arrow key to move back, and the Back Space key to delete the selection, and then enter your new selection. Now go ahead and enter a number. Notice if you enter a number out of the ?20 and 30 range, the computer will tell you that your choice is out of range and you need to change your selection. Now everybody please use the Back Space key to erase your choice, and then type in your rst decision. Now please press the S key and then the Enter key. Once you type the Enter key, you cannot change your choice anymore. After everyone sends their choices, the computer will calculate the sum of others' proposals, S, the variability, V , and your corresponding payo for this round, P, and send these numbers to your screen. This process will be repeated on each round. Now go ahead and record the result of the rst round to the rst row of your Record Sheet.
The H key allows you to review the history of your decisions and payo s. Once you are in the history page, you can use the arrow keys to choose the period.
Key Function Summaries
S: prepare to submit your choice. number. These numbers have been randomly arranged into a secret circle. This circle will remain the same in all rounds, but its arrangement will not be disclosed to you. The level of your individual expenditures depends upon your individual proposed addition (x), the proposed additions of other participants (S), and the di erence (d) between the amounts proposed by the individual to the left of you in the circle, and the individual to the right of you. For example, if the circle is 1-2-3-4-5-1, and the proposed additions are x 1 = 1; x 2 = 2; x 3 = 3; x 4 = 4; x 5 = 5 respectively, then for subject No. 1, the sum of others' proposed addition is S 1 = x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 = 14. (Notice that S 1 is also Y ? x 1 .) The di erence between his/her two neighbors for subject No. 1 is d 1 = x 5 ? x 2 = 3, and the di erence between his/her two neighbors for subject No. 2 is d 2 = x1 ? x3 = ?2. Notice that your proposed addition does not a ect the calculation of S and d. Your expenditure 13 is your individual \price" for the project, multiplied by the project level, and then divided by 25. Your individual \price" for the project is a base price, 100, which is the same for everyone, plus the di erence (d) between the amounts proposed by your two neighbors. For your convenience, some payo charts that summarize all of the relevant information will be used.
Payo Charts The payo charts will summarize both the value to you of the project level chosen and the amount of individual expenditures that you will incur depending upon the choices of additions that you and other participants make. The horizontal axis is the sum of others' proposed additions, S. The vertical axis is your net payo . Each curve represents your payo from a particular choice of proposed addition, x. The small box on the right hand side of the chart gives the color of the curve for the eleven di erent proposed additions charted. Since the chart would be di cult to read if all possible proposed additions were plotted, only eleven di erent ones equal distant from each other are given. The curves for proposed additions which are not given, lie between the given curves. For example, the curve for a proposed addition of x=11 would be between those of x=9 and x=14 and slightly closer to the x=9 curve than the x=14 curve. The payo charts are ordered by the di erence (d) between your neighbors' proposals. This value, which ranges from -50 to 50 with a step of 5, is located at the lower right corner of each chart. Table 3 : Group e ciency, mean level of public good (standard deviation), average absolute deviation from the optimal level of public good, and total number of violations of the IR constraints in each session.
